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Article
What is a “problem”?1 When the term is used in health policy 
analysis—and it is used frequently—what is meant by it? 
And, are these presumed meanings relevant in some way to 
the cogency of our political analyses?
In this article, I make the case that it is important to alert 
policy researchers generally and health promotion advo-
cates in particular to the implications of the meanings they 
attribute to the concept problem, and to possible inconsis-
tencies in usage. Specifically, I argue that, in positivist, 
interpretive, and critical realist paradigms, the term tends to 
be associated with some notion of an existing “problematic 
situation” (Koon, Hawkins, & Mayhew, 2016, p. 3). 
Moreover, the language of problems is often adopted with-
out problematizing the term, implying a pre-existing condi-
tion or set of conditions exogenous to or outside of the 
policy process that must be addressed (Koon et al., 2016). 
Of course, such a claim needs to reflect on the place of prob-
lem definition and frame theory within these perspectives, 
as will be done below. Despite these more nuanced posi-
tions, there remains a tendency to refer to problems as 
assumed starting points for reflection, possibly limiting the 
critical potential of the analysis.
Counter this position, a contrasting Foucault-influenced 
poststructural approach to policy analysis—“What’s the 
Problem Represented to be?” (WPR approach)—is intro-
duced. In a WPR form of analysis, “problems” do not sit 
outside policy processes waiting to be solved. Instead, they 
are produced as problems of particular kinds within policies 
and policy proposals. That is, every policy proposal con-
tains within it an implicit representation of what the problem 
is represented to be. As a simple example, policies that pro-
mote training for women as a means to increase their num-
bers in positions of influence implicitly represent the 
problem to be women’s lack of training. To study this policy, 
therefore, there is a need to interrogate critically how wom-
en’s lack of training is problematized, the premises this rep-
resentation of the “problem” rests upon, and its effects. As a 
result, the focus for policy analysis shifts from problems as 
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presumed problematic conditions to problematizations, how 
“problems” are constituted—given shape and meaning—
within policies.2
The article proceeds in two parts. In the first, four para-
digms in health policy research—positivist, interpretive, 
critical realist, and poststructuralist—are examined for their 
grounding assumptions and political implications. Specific 
policy process theories and frameworks—respectively, com-
prehensive rationalism, Kingdon’s (1984/2003) “problem 
stream,” “wicked problems,” and the WPR approach—are 
used to illustrate these premises, with a focus on how “prob-
lems” are conceptualized within these frameworks. A second 
section, headed “Applying WPR,” directs attention to health 
policy analyses that ask questions about how “problems” are 
conceptualized within policy texts. It proceeds to contrast 
these approaches with a WPR form of analysis, using exam-
ples from Australian public policy. The article concludes 
with brief reflections on the possible uses and feasibility of 
including a WPR form of policy analysis in health policy 
research.
Throughout the article, attention is drawn to the political 
implications of theoretical perspectives. With Annemarie Mol 
(2002), the case is made that our methods “are not a way of 
opening a window on the world, but a way of interfering with 
it. They act, they mediate between an object and its represen-
tations” (p. 155, emphasis in original). In this view, paradigms 
matter and researchers are involved necessarily in an onto-
logical politics (Mol, 1999), creating specific social and polit-
ical realities (Bacchi & Rönnblom, 2014). It follows that 
researchers have a responsibility to reflect critically on the 
realities their methods create, enjoining a self-problematizing 
approach to methodological commitments.
Paradigms in Health Policy
Currently, a good deal of attention is directed to the political 
science models available to health policy researchers to 
assist them in navigating the difficult path of policy develop-
ment (Bernier & Clavier, 2011; Clavier & de Leeuw, 2013; 
de Leeuw, 2007). In this article, I take a step back from iden-
tified frameworks and theories to offer comments at the level 
of paradigms (see Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011). I undertake 
this form of analysis because I wish to highlight common 
paradigmatic assumptions that cut across theoretical per-
spectives among health policy researchers. For example, 
critical realist premises underpin theory-based evaluation, 
which is associated with a “theory of change/action,” sys-
tems theory, complexity theory, and logic programs, methods 
endorsed in recent World Health Organization (WHO, 2015) 
publications. Identified paradigmatic assumptions will be 
interrogated through the lens of “problems”—how “prob-
lems” are conceptualized—within specific frameworks, for 
example, comprehensive rationalism, Kingdon’s (1984/2003) 
“problem stream,” “wicked problems,” and Bacchi’s (2009) 
WPR approach.
I take as my starting point Lucy Gilson’s edited methodol-
ogy reader for Health Policy and Systems Research (HRSR), 
published by the WHO in 2012. Gilson’s (2012) heuristic has 
been selected for two reasons: First, it highlights the impor-
tance, for health policy research, of reflecting on the ways in 
which researchers understand the world and their views on 
how to “know” about “it” (p. 35); and, second, it directs 
attention to two increasingly popular perspectives in health 
policy research, interpretivism and critical realism. 
Unfortunately, Gilson neglects to consider a poststructuralist 
paradigm, which will be introduced following comments on 
positivism, interpretivism, and critical realism, with WPR as 
exemplar. To forecast the argument, I suggest that paradig-
matic assumptions within interpretivism and critical realism 
pose challenges to those who wish to enlist these perspec-
tives in a program of substantive structural change, giving 
pause to those who deploy them.
Positivism
Generally positivism remains the dominant paradigm within 
medical research, relying upon an assumption that indepen-
dent (objective) scholars can access information, or evi-
dence, about “the real.” Facts and values are held to be 
separate and distinct. The categories of “research material” 
and “researcher” are treated as closed and fixed. The main 
research involves discovering associations among identified 
factors to discover “what works.” This model of evidence-
based medicine lies behind randomized control trials (RCTs), 
which are located at the summit of the “hierarchy of evi-
dence.” RCTs and systematic reviews of RCTs provide the 
main sources of research produced by the Cochrane 
Collaboration (Bacchi, 2009).
To gain credibility, social scientists try, at times, to 
mimic the medical model. Duflo (Duflo, Dupras, Kremer, 
& Sinei, 2007; Duflo & Kremer, 2003) is only the most 
obvious case where this mimicry takes place. More gener-
ally, there are attempts to set up “experiments” where “vari-
ables” can be tested and causality determined. The social 
science equivalent of the Cochrane Collaboration is the 
Campbell Collaboration.
The mantra “what works?” has, as an unstated premise, 
some notion of the problem being addressed. In other words, 
“what works?” implies that something requires “fixing” or 
“solving.” Problems are exogenous to the analysis. Their sta-
tus as independent phenomena requiring intervention is 
unquestioned.
Comprehensive rationalism. We can see this form of reasoning 
operating within policy studies in what has been described as 
comprehensive rationality or the rational comprehensive 
model (Bacchi, 1999). This approach endorses the view that 
there is a real world that is accessible to objective description 
and analysis. The process of making policy is set out in clear-
cut “stages”: agenda setting, formulation, implementation, 
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and evaluation. There is an assumption that there is some 
readily identifiable social/economic problem that needs 
“addressing” and that policy makers get together and do their 
best to come up with a policy that will “deal with” this prob-
lem. A further assumption is that they will approach this task 
rationally and come up with the best solution given cultural, 
political, and economic constraints. There is a presumed 
“decision space” at the outset of the policy process where 
problems are identified. The real work, as it were, consists in 
finding solutions—often, technical solutions—to those prob-
lems. The emphasis on measurement and technical expertise 
leads to the labeling of this approach, in some accounts, as 
“technical rationalism.”
The idea in comprehensive rationalism, noted above, that 
it makes sense to describe the policy-making process as a 
series of “stages,” is popular in health policy research, though 
typically those who employ this schema insist that the model 
is not intended to imply strict separation among the identi-
fied steps (Walt et al., 2008). For example, the WHO’s (2015) 
Training Manual for Health in All Policies (HiAP), offered 
here as an up-to-date and representative example of main-
stream health policy theorizing, lists the following stages in 
policy making:
●  Agenda setting (identify the problem, conduct research, 
formulate policy);
●  Policy formation (develop policy options, negotiate, 
formulate policy);
●  Policy implementation (implement and enforce policy); and
●  Policy review (monitoring, evaluation, and reporting). 
(p. 57; emphasis added)
The authors of the Manual remind readers that the complex 
nature of HiAP—that it is “an inherently political process 
that involves the reallocation of resources including power 
and responsibilities”—means that the process is “not neces-
sarily linear” (WHO, 2015, p. 58).
Notably, for the purposes of this article, the initial “stage” 
of agenda setting is described as involving “problem identi-
fication,” implying that problems exist separate from the 
policy process and need only to be named. The remainder of 
the document, however, tells a different story about “com-
plex social problems,” which are called “wicked,” and about 
the processes of problem redefinition and reframing (WHO, 
2015, pp. 54-56).
The adoption of a “stages” heuristic in this WHO Training 
Manual, therefore, does not necessarily signal a positivist 
orientation. Other paradigms, specifically interpretive and 
critical realist paradigms, are at work in the same document, 
and require further analysis, especially given the growing 
popularity of these paradigms in the health policy field. 
Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that, regardless of 
stated orientation, the heavy reliance on epidemiological 
measurement and frequent appeals to (hard) “science” 
(Bacigalupe, Esnaola, Martín, & Zuazagoitia, 2010, p. 505; 
Puska, 2007, p. 328; Sihto, Ollila, & Koivusalo, 2006, p. 4) 
indicate the continuing strength of positivism in health pol-
icy research.
Interpretivism
Interpretivism turns its primary attention to the social actors in 
policy research, both those conducting the research and those 
who are research “subjects.” Interpretivists are located in a 
hermeneutic tradition that sees people’s self-interpretations as 
central to understanding social organization. In contrast to 
positivism, the category of “the subject” is opened up to reflect 
on how subjects create meaning in their lives. The positivist 
objective of establishing distance from research subjects is 
countered by an emphasis on how subjects interpret their 
experiences (Gilson, 2012, p. 35). Attention shifts from the 
positivist objective of predicting outcomes to an interpretive 
focus on understanding social interactions. Rather than 
attempting to isolate “facts” from “values,” as in positivism, 
people’s beliefs and intentions become central to the research 
exercise.
An interpretive approach to policy making can be traced 
to the development of a political rationalist tradition in 
1970s policy studies (Bacchi, 1999). Theorists in this tradi-
tion object to the impression conveyed by technical rational-
ists that policy is a straightforward matter of finding technical 
answers (solutions) to readily identified problems. They are 
much more sensitive to the give and take of politics, to the 
shifting of perspectives and positions, and to the role played 
by politics, here meaning party politics and bureaucratic pol-
itics, in decision making. Importantly, they address the need 
to talk about the role of values in policy making.
Political rationalists counter the emphasis on expertise in 
comprehensive rationalism with a commitment to ensuring 
that the process of decision making is as open as possible. 
Hence, they are pluralists. They are also incrementalists, 
believing that the “limited cognitive capacity of the human 
being” requires that analysis should be simplified in all pos-
sible ways, “for example, by proceeding step by step through 
trial and error rather than trying to comprehend a problem in 
its entirety” (Lindblom, 1980, p. 35).
It is possible to identify among early political rationalists, 
such as Lindblom (1980) and Wildavsky (1979), similar con-
cerns and themes to those dominating health policy discus-
sions and reports today. Specifically, they expressed growing 
disquiet about the complexity, uncertainty, and political 
maneuvering surrounding policy processes. The political cli-
mate of the 1970s highlighted an erosion of consensus in 
American politics—where these debates played out—lead-
ing to the conclusion that “the nature of the problem is itself 
in doubt” (Rein & Schön, 1977, p. 237). Importantly for this 
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article, therefore, political rationalists objected to the lack of 
attention in technical rationalism to that “most crucial aspect” 
of policy development described as “problem formulation” 
or “problem setting” (Rein & Schön, 1977, pp. 235-236).
While this naming of problems as critical components of 
the policy process is salutary, for political rationalists, “prob-
lem setting” is limited to the analytic task of forming prob-
lems in ways that make them manageable. Dery (1984), for 
example, dedicates an entire book to “problem definition,” 
which in his view requires political scientists to be concerned 
“with the production of administratively workable and politi-
cally realistic ideas for solving social problems” (p. 38). 
Wildavsky (1979) concurs that “in public policy . . . creativ-
ity consists of finding a problem about which something can 
and ought to be done. In a word, the solution is part of defin-
ing the problem” (p. 3). This pragmatic orientation reduces 
the space for contesting how “problems” are constituted in 
policies.
Along similar lines, Rein and Schön (1977) introduce the 
language of framing to clarify what “problem setting” 
involves. “Framing,” they explain, refers to the process by 
which “worries, arising in problematic situations, can be 
converted into the orderly formation of problems” (Rein and 
Schön, 1977, p. 238), a goal echoed in the sub-title of their 
important book on framing theory (Schön & Rein, 1994): 
“Towards the resolution of intractable policy controversies.” 
Rein and Schön (1977) set as criteria for this analytic task a 
principle of consistency and a principle of testability—“the 
theory or model contained in problem setting should be sub-
ject to empirical test; it should be capable of disconfirma-
tion” (p. 249). The appeal to empirical testing indicates a 
lingering positivism despite the sensitivity to the impact of 
competing values in political processes. Moreover, despite 
expressed doubts about the very “nature of the problem” 
(Rein & Schön, 1977, p. 237), there is still a sense that the 
goal is “solving social problems” (Dery, 1984, p. 38), as if 
these are readily identifiable and outside the policy-making 
process.
The language of problem definition and problem framing 
proliferates in contemporary health policy analysis, as does 
the concept of “wicked problems,” coined by Rittel and 
Webber (1973). An important task for this article is consider-
ing how “problems” are conceptualized in these usages. 
“Wicked problems” is tackled in the section on critical real-
ism, where, I suggest, it belongs. The remainder of this sec-
tion pursues contemporary interpretations of problem 
definition and framing in the work of John Kingdon 
(1984/2003) and in the WHO (2015) HiAP Training Manual, 
introduced above.
Kingdon’s “three streams.” Although Kingdon’s book intro-
ducing his “three streams” approach to policy development 
was first published over 30 years ago, in 1984, it has recently 
been endorsed by Colebatch, a leading interpretivist (Lan-
caster, Ritter, & Colebatch, 2014), and continues to be one of 
the main political science frameworks adapted by health 
policy researchers (Baum, Lawless, & Williams, 2013; 
Leppo, Ollila, Peña, Wismar, & Cook, 2013). Kingdon’s 
focus is policy making not policy analysis. That is, he sets 
out to describe the forces at work getting “conditions” onto 
the political agenda as “problems.” In the Foreword to the 
second edition, Thurber (2003) describes the goal as under-
standing “the complexity and dynamics of how the national 
agenda is set” (p. vii).
Kingdon distinguishes among three separate streams 
within policy making, which he labels “problem, policy, and 
politics.” A novelty in his approach is his insistence on the 
separation of these three streams—each has a life of its own. 
So, for example, Kingdon insists that policies are generated 
in the policy stream with no necessary connection to the 
problem stream. In fact, he argues that proposals more or less 
wait for a problem to become available. This argument leads 
him to question the emphasis in much policy theory on 
“problem solving” (Kingdon, 1984/2003, p. 18). His con-
cern, by contrast, is to explain how items make it onto the 
policy agenda through “windows of opportunity” and due to 
the skills of “policy entrepreneurs.”
In Kingdon’s (1984/2003) view, a key political process is 
how “conditions” become problems, which he states signals 
that someone has decided to do something about them 
(p. 109). This “becoming” problem, he argues, always has “a 
perceptual, interpretive element” (p. 110). There is a short 
section in the book on problem definition and the language 
of framing is also used. As Lancaster et al. (2014) describe, 
for Kingdon, policy making is conceived as “an ongoing pro-
cess of managing the problematic” (p. 148).
This very description signals the ambiguity around the 
notion of “problem” in Kingdon. What is “the problematic”? 
How is this determined? At times, Kingdon (2003) refers to 
problems as if they have an independent status. For example, 
he says that “problems are not simply the conditions or exter-
nal events themselves” (p. 109; emphasis added), implying 
of course that, to an extent, they are exactly those conditions 
or events. He tells us, “Problems are brought to the attention 
of people in and around government” (p. 19), suggesting that 
they exist exogenously, though he also states, “The data do 
not speak for themselves” (p. 94). The exact status of prob-
lems therefore is left hanging due to the primary concern 
with agenda-setting—having an issue reach the policy 
agenda. For Kingdon, a problem is an issue that achieves 
problem status!
This argument, for which Kingdon is most often cited 
(Exworthy, 2008; Baum et al., 2013), leaves behind the rec-
ognition of contestation over the understanding of the prob-
lem in Kingdon’s discussion of problem definition and 
framing. It comes to appear that the primary political exercise 
is having an issue taken up on a policy agenda, downplaying 
or rendering irrelevant the key dimension of how the problem 
is to be conceived. This ambivalence about the nature or sta-
tus of a “problem” is reflected in other interpretivist accounts. 
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While “issues” are treated as “equivocal discussion topics 
that are named, blamed and claimed as disputants argue about 
them” (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 170), they appear also as prod-
ucts of “multiple perspectives on how to address a particular 
problem” (Koon et al., 2016, p. 3, emphasis added).
Here it is important to note that, for Kingdon, as for other 
interpretivists (Fischer, 2003; Hoppe, 2011), reflecting the 
hermeneutic influence, problem definition and framing are 
understood primarily as activities instigated by social actors. 
Referring specifically to interpretive research on framing, 
Koon et al. (2016) note the focus on “how actors create mean-
ing in the policy process and how they package these mean-
ings for instrumental and expressive purposes” (p. 7). As an 
example of this tradition, Rochefort and Cobb (1994) con-
sider how governments respond to the competing problem 
definitions produced by “issue advocates” (p. 15; for discus-
sion, see Bacchi, 1999, pp. 36-37, 45). Similarly, for Kingdon, 
policy making is “an arena where a variety of participants 
with different perspectives, power and roles contest both what 
the policy problem is and what (or indeed whether anything) 
should be done about it” (Lancaster et al., 2014, p. 149).
By contrast, as discussed below, in the place of a sover-
eign subject who can access “true” meaning (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 54), poststructural policy analysis considers how govern-
mental problematizations produce particular kinds of provi-
sional “subject”. Social actors are understood to be in 
continual formation; hence, they form part of what must be 
“interpreted” rather than the starting point of interpretation. 
In line with this perspective, whereas interpretivists tend to 
focus on the problematizations that people produce, post-
structural policy analysis interrogates the governmental 
problematizations that constitute what “subjects” can become 
(Bacchi & Goodwin, in press).
As a result, in poststructural policy analysis, the analytic 
focus shifts from the competing perspectives of policy 
actors—how they understand a “problem”—to the prob-
lematizations (the ways in which “problems” are produced 
and represented) in governmental policies and practices 
(Bacchi, 2015). Whereas for Kingdon, the goal is achieving 
problem status for a “condition,” through its inclusion on a 
government’s agenda, for analytic strategies such as WPR 
(developed below), the fixing of “troubling conditions” 
(Bacchi, 2009, p. xi) as “problems” or “social problems” 
instigates critical analysis of how those “problems” are con-
stituted as “problems” of a particular sort within policies. For 
Kingdon, achieving problem status for a “condition” is the 
goal; for WPR, such an “achievement” initiates a critical 
analytical process (see examples of application of WPR later 
in the article).
The HiAP Training Manual (WHO, 2015), as signaled 
above, serves as a useful example of an interpretive perspec-
tive. It draws explicitly on Kingdon’s three streams model to 
reflect on the possibility of creating “windows of opportu-
nity” (p. 58). Attention is also directed to “framing,” 
described as “how an issue is defined, which can in turn 
influence how the issue is viewed (non-issue, problem, cri-
sis, etc.), who is considered responsible and the cause and 
possible solutions” (p. 59). The particular concern is encour-
aging “policy stakeholders” (i.e., social actors) to engage in 
“redefining or reframing the problem” to allow “for new 
ways of understanding, which can encourage new stakehold-
ers to engage in the policy process” (p. 59). Again, drawing 
on Kingdon, “policy champions/policy entrepreneurs,” those 
who “proactively promote policy reforms,” also “frame dis-
cussion of the issue, build consensus, attract resources, and 
seize and create opportunities to move the reform forward” 
(p. 61). Alongside this brief acknowledgment of how “prob-
lems” involve interpretation, the bulk of the numerous refer-
ences to policy problems in the HiAP Manual imply that 
their status is uncontentious (e.g., “strong evidence of the 
problem,” p. 32; “the magnitude of the problem,” p. 59).
This variation in the meanings of the term problem sig-
nals, I suggest, the need for more attention to the implica-
tions of specific usages. While interpretivists helpfully alert 
analysts to the ways in which social actors give “problems” 
specific meanings, the political implications of how “prob-
lems” are constituted within policies are not generally con-
sidered. However, several authors use the language of 
framing to refer to the meanings produced within a policy 
rather than meanings imputed by social actors. These contri-
butions and how WPR differs from them are considered in 
the second part of the article. Before undertaking this analy-
sis, it is necessary to examine both the increasingly popular 
critical realist paradigm and a poststructuralist alternative.
Critical Realism
Gilson (2012) usefully locates critical realism “somewhere 
between” positivism and interpretivism (pp. 35-36). Theorists 
within this paradigm postulate a reality existing “indepen-
dently of social actors” while accepting that the interpreta-
tions of those actors can influence that reality, and that a 
“range of individual, group, organizational and societal pro-
cesses and structures” influence human action.
Critical realism has had a significant influence in health 
policy research, primarily through the approach to program 
evaluation developed by Pawson and Tilley (1997, 2004; 
Haigh, Harris, & Haigh, 2012; Hunter & Killoran, 2004; 
Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey, & Walshe, 2005; Sanderson, 
2000). “Realist evaluation,” or sometimes “realistic evalua-
tion” (Pawson & Tilley, 2004, p. 3), the focus of analysis in 
this article, has links to theory-based evaluation—an 
approach with a long history in organization studies—to 
Weiss’s (2000) “theory of change” and to “logic programs” 
(Brickmayer & Weiss, 2000; Leeuw, 2003; Taylor-Powell, 
Jones, & Henert, 2003). This cluster of theories alters the 
positivist evidence-based question “what works?” asking 
instead “what works for whom in what circumstances and in 
what respects, and how?” (Pawson & Tilley, 2004, p. 2). This 
question has great appeal among health policy researchers, 
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as it recognizes the need to examine the “contexts” within 
which policy interventions operate (Baum et al., 2014, 
p. i135; Clavier & de Leeuw, 2013, p. 16). However, it 
becomes necessary to reflect on how that formulation—
“what works for whom in what circumstance?”—conceptu-
alizes contexts, subjects, and problems.
Importantly, the primary focus in realist evaluation is on 
the behaviors of social actors. Programs (policies) are 
described as theories that raise hypotheses about how people 
will behave in specific circumstances. As Pawson et al. 
(2005) explain, “Such conjectures are grounded on assump-
tions about what gives rise to poor performance, inappropri-
ate behavior and so on, and how changes may be made to 
these patterns” (p. S1:22). Programs, we are told, “only work 
through the stakeholders’ reasoning and knowledge of that 
reasoning is integral to understanding its outcomes” (p. 
S1:22). This insistence that “at least part of the explanation” 
for the successes and failures of interventions can be traced 
to “reasoning and personal choices of different actors and 
participants” indicates a link to rational choice theory, 
acknowledged by Pawson (2002, p. 356). To test hypotheses 
about “behavioural mechanisms,” Leeuw (2003) turns to 
“the state of the art within the social/behavioural/economic 
sciences” (p. 8).
As the poststructural scholars Glynos and Howarth (2007, 
p. 84) point out, this focus on individuals and their behaviors 
betrays a methodological individualism, which, I suggest, 
ought to be of concern to health policy researchers who pro-
mote the social determinants of health (SDH). Indeed, given 
the focus on individual behaviors, the popularity of critical 
realist forms of evaluation in health policy research may 
inadvertently contribute to the phenomenon of “lifestyle 
drift”—the emphasis in much contemporary health policy on 
links between lifestyle “factors” and poor health—which so 
disturbs these researchers (Baum, 2011; Hunter, Popay, & 
Tannahill, 2010; Schrecker, 2013).
Pawson and Tilley (2004) emphasize that “realists regard 
programmes as rather sophisticated social interactions set 
amidst a complex social reality,” creating a link to complex-
ity theory, systems theory, and “wicked problems,” detailed 
below (p. 6). To “deal with” such “intricacy” (complexity), 
they call upon “science” to develop an “analytic framework 
to break down systems into their key components and 
processes”—“mechanisms,” “contexts,” and “outcomes”—
called CMOCs (context-mechanism-outcome pattern con-
figurations) (pp. 6, 9). Programs provide resources to social 
actors; how those actors interpret and act upon the “interven-
tion stratagem,” or “mechanism,” then determines “success” 
or “failure” (p. 6), returning us to the motivations and behav-
iors of individuals (i.e., methodological individualism).
The researcher (with the stakeholder) posits the “potential 
processes through which a program may work.” These pro-
cesses consist of hypotheses or conjectures about how people 
will behave, as mentioned above. They “pinpoint the ways in 
which the resources on offer may permeate into the 
reasoning of the subjects” (Pawson & Tilley, 2004, p. 7). The 
evaluator’s task is to test these hypotheses empirically, draw-
ing on a wide range of “evidence,” both qualitative and quan-
titative (p. 11). On this point, Pawson and Tilley insist, 
“Realist research is absolutely conventional, and pleased to 
be so, in utilizing the time-honored ‘research cycle’ of 
hypothesis testing and refinement” (p. 10).
This evaluation method is underpinned by an understand-
ing of “causation” as “complex.” There is an explicit chal-
lenge to the positivist stance on “causal laws”—described as 
a “successionist” model of causality dependent on “constant 
conjunctures”—and an endorsement of a “generative” model 
(Pawson et al., 2005, p. S1:21-22). To make a “causal infer-
ence” between “two events (X and Y),” “one needs to under-
stand the underlying mechanism (M) that connects them and 
the context (C) in which the relationship occurs” (p. S1:21-
22). Recalling that mechanisms refer to hypotheses about 
individuals’ behaviors, this understanding of causality relies 
upon the same methodological individualism highlighted 
and queried above. Moreover, the commitment to scientific 
testing of hypothesized “causal mechanisms” indicates a 
residual positivism, despite protestations to the contrary (see 
Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 32).
As described by Glynos and Howarth (2007), the realist 
view of causality as necessarily operating through social 
actors appears in descriptions of “causal chains” (p. 90), 
which “link” to individuals in the last instance (see also 
“causal pathways,” Exworthy, 2008, p. 319). Indeed, many 
of the explanatory models of social change operating in pub-
lic health and SDH research position the individual as the 
ultimate target—for example, “causes of the causes” 
(Marmot & Allen, 2014, p. S517), “social determinants of 
behaviours and lifestyles” (Marmot, Allen, Bell, Bloomer, & 
Goldblatt, 2012, p. 1025), and Dahlgren and Whitehead’s 
(1991) model of the main determinants of health with indi-
vidual lifestyle factors positioned near the center of the con-
centric circles of “influence” (Exworthy, 2008, p. 320). 
Freeman (2006) appropriately characterizes the last of these 
as belonging “securely in a rationalist, hierarchical, or mod-
ernist conception of cause, one that can confidently separate 
dependent from independent and proximal from distal vari-
ables” (p. 65).
In these explanations, “contexts” tend to be treated as 
“mediating factors,” located somewhere along the “chain.” 
Hart and Moore (2014) note the tendency in epidemiology to 
constitute social factors (“contexts”) as intermediaries, “held 
at arms-length from causation” (p. 406). Krieger (2008) cau-
tions against distinguishing between the “murky realm of 
‘distal’” causal factors and “proximal” causal factors, which 
positions structural or social interventions “at a distance” 
(p. 223; see also Freeman, 2006, on upstream/downstream). 
This caution appears relevant to “causal chains” as well. 
Logic programs, which have clear links to theory-based eval-
uation and critical realism, incorporate “external factors” (or 
“environment” or “context”) as part of the analysis. However, 
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such factors attract little attention and the primary focus 
remains on the individual subject (Taylor-Powell et al., 
2003). Moreover, there are as many disputes about the nature 
of a “context” as there are about the character of a “problem” 
(think, for example, of debates about “globalization”), cau-
tioning against reliance on an uncontested notion of context 
(Dilkes-Frayne, 2014).
In terms of approaches to policy making, realist evalua-
tion again appears to be quite conventional. “Typically,” 
according to Pawson and Tilley (2004), there are a series of 
“phases” (p. 13). The first phase, they explain, involves “pre-
liminary analysis of the problem” and “problem identifica-
tion,” reminding us somewhat disturbingly of comprehensive 
rationalism (Pawson et al., 2005, p. S1:22; emphasis in origi-
nal). The critical realist, Norman Fairclough (2013), declares 
himself a “moderate constructivist,” in which the point of 
critique is to ask “what the problems really are” (p. 185). In 
his account, problematizations represent the views of various 
groups of social actors about the nature of those problems. 
This understanding of problematization sits at some distance 
from the focus in Foucault-influenced poststructuralism and 
a WPR analysis on the implicit problematizations within 
policies, described in the following section.
In addition, in realist evaluation, the room for critical 
analysis is constrained because problems tend to be pre-
scribed by those commissioning the evaluation. Consider, for 
example, Pawson et al.’s (2005) realist evaluation of perfor-
mance measurement. Where a WPR analysis would identify 
such a program as a governing technology and hence deserv-
ing of critical analysis (see below), for Pawson et al. (2005), 
the starting point is simply to measure, rate, and (“some-
times”) rank “the performance in question” (p. S1:22). 
Similarly, in Tilley’s (2004, 2010) work on situational crime 
prevention and “problem-oriented policing” (emphasis 
added), it is not possible to raise questions about the meaning 
of “crime” (compare Bacchi, 2009, Chapter 5). Rather, the 
assumed existence and character of so-called “problem 
behaviors” are unquestioned, suggesting a worrying norma-
tive agenda in realist evaluation.
Illustrating the possibly didactic and integrative character 
of programs that assume problems, in comments on a theory-
based evaluation of some U.S. community initiatives, Weiss 
(2000) concludes,
Now that services are more convenient and more appropriate for 
the residents’ needs, they attend regularly and do what they are 
supposed to do (take medication, attend homework help 
programs, and so on). The end result is improved functioning of 
the families and healthy, productive adolescents. (p. 105, 
emphasis added)
In this stance, health “becomes a metaphor for the success of 
the state with respect to those governed” (McQueen, Wismar, 
Lin, & Jones, 2012, p. 8). These limitations on the kinds of 
questions that can be raised about policies and programs 
appear again in the turn to “complexity,” “systems,” and 
“wicked problems,” pursued below.
“Wicked problems.” The language of “wicked problems” has 
proliferated in health policy research alongside the uptake of 
critical realist forms of evaluation. The link between the two 
is complexity, a concept with diverse associations (Urry, 
2005). For critical realists, as Baum et al. (2014, p. i133) 
note, quoting Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey, and Walshe 
(2004, p. iv), “social (or in this case policy) interventions are 
‘complex systems thrust amidst complex systems,’” linking 
this perspective to systems theory (de Savigny & Adam, 
2009, p. 30). Hunter (2013) refers to “the complex reality and 
nature of wicked problems” (p. 149, emphasis added).
“Wicked problems” is conceptual shorthand used to char-
acterize “messy,” “fuzzy” problems, which are described as 
multi-causal and requiring intersectoral interventions, such 
as HiAP. The concept can be traced, in its initial formulation, 
to the urban planners, Rittel and Webber (1973). A more 
recent incarnation is Ritchey’s (2011) Wicked problems—
Social Messes, referenced in the WHO’s (2015) HiAP 
Training Manual. From the Australian Public Service 
Commission (2007, p. 1) to the WHO (2015, pp. 51-4), there 
is unanimity that “wicked problems”—the prime example is 
obesity—occur in “health areas.”
“Wicked problems” are characterized differently in spe-
cific sites, with important political implications. The WHO’s 
(2015) HiAP Training Manual, for example, describes 
wicked problems as “subjective” (p. 55), a characterization 
that appears in Ritchey (2011, p. 20) but not in Rittel and 
Webber’s (1973) original formulation. Such a characteriza-
tion seems dangerously depoliticizing.
The WHO makes the point that, for “complex” or 
“wicked” problems, “interventions must be flexible as out-
comes may be unforeseen” (WHO, 2015, p. 52). At the same 
time, however, it is held to be possible to “model” “wicked 
problems” through methods such as General Morphological 
Analysis (GMA; Ritchey, 2011; see also Tremblay and 
Richard, 2011, p. 381). Complexity and hence “wicked prob-
lems” are thus deemed to be manageable through the kind of 
logic models introduced above, models traceable to logframe 
matrices and “problem trees” (AusAid, 2005). As in realist 
evaluation, these models work through the behaviors of 
social actors, reinforcing a focus on lifestyles that ought to be 
a concern for proponents of SDH. Ferlie, Fitzgerald, 
McGivern, Dopson, and Bennett (2011) describe “challeng-
ing behaviour change objectives” as a core feature of a 
“wicked problems” (p. 322) approach to policy (see also 
Australian Public Service Commission, 2007, p. 32).
Systems thinking claims to offer “an approach to problem 
solving that views ‘problems’ as part of a wider, dynamic 
system” (de Savigny & Adam, 2009, p. 33, emphasis added). 
However, the space to consider just where these “problems” 
come from and how they are understood is severely con-
strained. In Ritchey’s (2011) GMA, the “problem area” is set 
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by the “principal client,” and stakeholders are invited to con-
sider “different aspects of the problem complex” (pp. 64-67). 
He offers the case study of “youth and criminality” in Sweden 
as a “consequence of social exclusion” (p. 81). As with “per-
formance measurement” and “situational crime prevention” 
in Pawson and Tilley’s work (see above), the key referents 
“youth,” “criminality,” and “social exclusion” are taken as 
given, restricting the critical interrogation that is possible. In 
effect, the term wicked problems, therefore, reinforces the 
conventional, pervasive view of policy as reacting to prob-
lems that must be solved. De Savigny and Adam (2009) 
describe systems thinking as a problem-solving approach. 
Moreover, the objective of GMA is to create a “common 
problem concept” (Ritchey, 2011, p. 28), reducing the pos-
sibility of contestation. By contrast, poststructuralism, as 
described below, creates a space for questioning taken-for-
granted concepts and categories.
Poststructuralism
There is no single poststructural theory. The WPR approach, 
offered as exemplar in this section (below), draws upon a 
Foucault-influenced poststructural perspective. In this view, 
there is a focus on the plurality of practices that produce hier-
archical and inegalitarian technologies of rule. Commitments 
to some notion of truth are replaced by an emphasis on dis-
courses, or knowledges, and the constitutive role of knowl-
edge practices. This emphasis on a plurality of practices 
means that “things,” including objects and subjects, are not 
essences. Rather, they are seen to be contingent and in pro-
cess, always developing and subject to change. We saw 
above how this approach to the subject as provisional and in 
formation leads to important differences from interpretivism, 
which takes the subject as the starting point for meaning 
making. The focus on the constitutive character of practices 
also produces a sharp distinction from critical realist prem-
ises. In Foucault-influenced poststructuralism, realities 
emerge in practices. Hence, a singular reality, assumed in 
critical realism, is deemed to be a political creation rather 
than an ontological given.
It has been suggested (Cilliers, 1998) that poststructural-
ism and complexity are natural allies, given the emphasis in 
the latter on plurality and contingency. However, such an 
argument ignores the political ethic of poststructualism. As 
Dillon (2000) suggests, “different techniques themselves 
entail different ethics or ways of being” (p. 7). Specifically, 
he finds that “much complexity thinking remains indebted to 
the modern project of science,” as displayed in the models 
above. The political focus in these accounts becomes how we 
can influence people to behave in desired/“desirable” ways 
instead of how we can produce a just society. The suggestion 
developed in this article is that some of these models, specifi-
cally those associated with realist evaluation, may actively 
undermine those justice goals by closing off the space to con-
sider how “problems” are constituted in policies.
Bacchi’s WPR approach. A WPR approach to policy analysis 
undertakes a task markedly different from the numerous pol-
icy process theories offered to assist advocates to get a policy 
onto the agenda or to explain “why and how policies fail or 
succeed” (de Leeuw, Clavier, & Benton, 2014, p. 8). By con-
trast, the starting point is a close analysis of items that make 
the political agenda to reflect upon the overall shape of policy 
initiatives, what they encompass and what they leave out. In 
addition, a WPR approach challenges the conventional and 
pervasive view that policies address problems. I describe this 
view as reactive in the sense that policies are conceived to be 
reactions to presumed problems or problematic situations—
with the term “problem” operating as a catch-all conceptual 
shorthand for diffuse and often unspecified issues.
In contrast, a WPR approach describes policies as produc-
tive or creative—constituting (making come into existence) 
“problems” as particular sorts of problems. The analysis starts 
from policy proposals and recommendations to see how they 
represent or constitute the “problems” they purport to address. 
Governing, it is argued, takes place through these problemati-
zations. We are not talking here about competing understand-
ings or perceptions of a problem presumed to exist, but the 
texts and discourses that produce “problems” of particular 
sorts within policies (Reekie, 1994, p. 463). Discourses, as 
understood in this perspective, consist of socially produced 
forms of knowledge that constitute “the real.”
Importantly, in this understanding, references to govern-
ing extend well beyond political institutions, party politics, 
networks, and even social movements to encompass the full 
range of knowledges (or discourses) and sites involved in 
societal administration. Because the practices and theories of 
“experts,” researchers, and professionals from diverse fields, 
including psychology, epidemiology, health promotion, and 
political science, are involved in governing, they become tar-
gets for critical analysis. Governing in this broad sense is 
described as a “problematizing activity” (Rose & Miller, 
1992, p. 181), in which “policy cannot get to work without 
first problematizing its territory” (T. Osborne, 1997, p. 174). 
The key to understanding how governing takes place, there-
fore, is to study how governing practices, understood broadly, 
problematize issues.
To say that policies create “problems” as particular sorts 
of problems does not mean to suggest that governments set 
out to produce homelessness or poverty, or even to deliber-
ately represent homelessness or poverty in particular ways. 
Rather, the proposition is that the specific policy or policy 
proposal contains within it an implicit representation of the 
“problem,” referred to as a problem representation (Bacchi, 
2009). This proposition relies upon a simple idea: That what 
we propose to do about something indicates what we think 
needs to change and hence what we think is problematic—
that is, what the “problem” is represented or constituted to 
be. Following this logic, it becomes possible to “read off” 
how the “problem” is constituted from examining a specific 
policy proposal. To conduct research in this way, one starts 
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from the proposed “solution” (the policy) and asks—“if the 
suggestion is that this form of change or intervention is 
required, what is the ‘problem’ represented (constituted) to 
be?” We saw an example above in the case of training pro-
grams for women.
Crucially, representations of “problems” are not images 
or imagined states; they are interventions. As Shapiro (1988) 
explains, “Representations do not imitate reality but are the 
practices through which things take on meaning and value” 
(p. xi). Anderson and Harrison (2010) concur,
As things and events they [representations] enact worlds, rather 
than being simple go-betweens tasked with re-presenting some 
pre-existing order or force. In their taking-place they have an 
expressive power as active interventions in the co-fabrication of 
worlds. (p. 14)
A problem representation therefore is the way in which a par-
ticular policy “problem” is constituted as the real (Bacchi, 
2012, p. 151).
Problematizations thus become part of how we are gov-
erned. That is, governing takes place through the ways in which 
“problems” are constituted in policies. Put in other words, we 
are governed through problematizations, rather than through 
policies, signaling the importance of critically interrogating 
problem representations. To undertake this task, a WPR 
approach offers several forms of interrelated questioning and 
analysis, which can be followed sequentially or applied as part 
of an integrated analysis (adapted from Bacchi, 2009, p. 48):
•• Question 1: What’s the “problem” of (e.g., “discrimi-
nation,” “problem gamblers,” “drug use/abuse,” 
“domestic violence,” “absenteeism,” “anti-social 
behavior”) represented to be (constituted to be) in a 
specific policy or policies?
•• Question 2: What presuppositions—necessary mean-
ings antecedent to an argument—and assumptions 
(ontological, epistemological) underlie this represen-
tation of the “problem” (problem representation)? 
This question involves a form of Foucauldian archae-
ology (Foucault, 1972).
•• Question 3: How has this representation of the “prob-
lem” come about? This question involves a form of 
Foucauldian genealogy (Foucault, 1971/1977).
•• Question 4: What is left unproblematic in this prob-
lem representation? Where are the silences?
•• Question 5: What effects (discursive, subjectification, 
and lived) are produced by this representation of the 
“problem”?
•• Question 6: How and where has this representation of 
the “problem” been produced, disseminated, and 
defended? How has it been and/or can it be ques-
tioned, disrupted, and replaced?
•• Step 7: Apply this list of questions to one’s own prob-
lem representations.
Adopting a genealogical perspective (Question 3) ensures 
that policies are considered in both temporal and spatial con-
text, always with an eye to the contestable nature of contexts 
(discussion above). Examining the effects or implications of 
specific problem representations (Question 5) involves con-
sideration of how they may make it difficult to raise certain 
issues (see also Question 4), how “subjects” are produced (or 
constituted) within them (subjectification), and the lived 
effects that accompany them. In this way, WPR provides a 
form of critical evaluation of policies and policy proposals.
This approach is poststructural in the sense that it takes 
nothing for granted in the “objects,” “subjects,” or “prob-
lems” that form the basis of policy analysis. Rather, these 
“things” are understood as shaped, or constituted, through 
practices. Practices, in this vocabulary, relate to a “zone or 
space of governmental intervention”: “To focus on prac-
tices is not to focus on the hard edge of (to adopt a superan-
nuated vocabulary) the ‘real-concrete,’ but upon the leading 
edges of governmental problematisation” (T. Osborne, 
1997, p. 176).
This perspective has significant implications for the ways 
in which we approach the policy field. Taken-for-granted 
categories and concepts—“drugs,” “addiction,” “crime,” 
“youth,” “skill,” “human capital,” “wellbeing”—become 
things to interrogate through scrutinizing the governmental 
practices and associated mentalities or rationalities that pro-
duce them (Dean, 1999). In addition, “subjects” are not pre-
sumed to exist as sovereign social actors; rather, who we 
become forms part of a continuing process, in which policies 
play an active role through making certain subject positions 
available. The concept “subject position” refers to the kinds 
of “subject” that it is possible to become in specific dis-
courses/knowledges (e.g., “the consumer,” “the caring 
mother,” “the delinquent,” “the problem gambler,” “the liter-
ate citizen”). For example, in other work, I describe policies 
as gendering practices to capture the active, ongoing, and 
always incomplete processes that constitute (make come into 
existence; Jones, 1997, p. 265) “women” and “men” as spe-
cific kinds of unequal political “subject” (Bacchi, in press).
Broadening the scope of the analysis to encompass the 
governing knowledges of “experts” and professionals brings 
new questions to policy analysis. Instead of assuming that 
government is limited to legislative enactments, we consider 
how such enactments rely on professional knowledges, for 
example, on psychological theories of child development or 
psychiatric diagnostic criteria (see Fraser, Moore, & Keane, 
2014). Consider, for example, the policy implications of the 
categorization of homosexuality as “sexual deviance” in the 
1952 edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM; Bacchi, 2009, p. 235) and the inclu-
sion of gambling as a diagnosable “behavioral addiction” in 
the most recent edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, section 312.31). A poststructural skepti-
cism about the taken-for-granted status of such knowledges 
leads to questions about their genealogy and their political 
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implications/effects. As Foucault (1981/1994) elaborates, 
this form of critique
does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the way they 
are. It consists in seeing on what type of assumptions, of familiar 
notions, of established, unexamined ways of thinking the 
accepted practices are based. (p. 456)
In line with a poststructural sensitivity to knowledge cre-
ation, the WPR approach encompasses an undertaking to 
apply the questions in the approach to one’s own policy pro-
posals in a practice of self-problematization (Step 7, above). 
Such a practice reflects recognition that each of us is 
immersed in the governing knowledges, the “unexamined 
ways of thinking,” of our age and that those among us posi-
tioned as “experts” or professionals have a responsibility to 
reflect on the political implications of the knowledges we 
deploy. The goal is to create the space to reflect critically on 
all proposals for change, including one’s own recommenda-
tions, to govern “with a minimum of domination” (Foucault, 
1987, p. 129). The following section provides examples of 
application of WPR, showing what a poststructural perspec-
tive can bring to policy analysis.
Applying WPR
This section of the article offers two exemplars to illustrate 
how to apply a WPR analytic strategy to specific policy 
examples: “Parental Engagement With Literacy” and 
“Income Quarantining.” Prior to undertaking this analysis, it 
is necessary to consider some novel applications of framing 
theory.
Alternative Framing Approaches
In the discussion of interpretivism above, the point was made 
that many scholars operating within this paradigm tend to 
focus on how social actors are involved in problem framing 
and definition. However, some important contributions in the 
health policy field (and elsewhere) explicitly analyze how 
“problems” are conceptualized within policy documents, 
suggesting useful connections to the kind of analysis offered 
by a WPR approach. These contributions move beyond the 
majority of policy process theories that focus on agenda set-
ting and policy development to reflect on the substantive 
content of health policies. It is important therefore to exam-
ine some of these contributions, to clarify their project and 
how WPR differs. The examples I use (Bambra, Smith, 
Garthwaite, Joyce, & Hunter, 2011; Freeman, 2006; Smith 
et al., 2009) take as their target how “health inequalities” or 
“health inequities” are conceptualized in selected policies, a 
central question for health policy research, as noted by 
Embrett and Randall (2014, pp. 153-154).
Smith et al. (2009) examine national policy statements on 
health inequalities in England, Scotland, and Wales since 
1997, specifically to see how the “policy problem” of “health 
inequalities” is “framed” differently within these varied 
texts. Here the focus is not on social actors “framing” an 
issue for “instrumental and expressive purposes” (Koon et al., 
2016, p. 7), as observed in earlier interpretive accounts—or 
at least not directly—but on how the policy text itself gives 
meaning to “equity,” which is recognized to be a contested 
concept (see Baum et al., 2013, p. 210). To make their com-
parisons among conceptions of “health inequalities,” the 
authors draw on the well-known distinction developed by 
Graham and Kelly (2004) among approaches that conceptu-
alize “health inequalities” as either a “problem” of “health 
disadvantage,” or “as a health gap,” or as “social gradient.” 
Theoretically, Smith et al. (2009) locate themselves within 
the “linguistic turn” (p. 220) and utilize critical discourse 
analysis, associated with Fairclough (2013). They set their 
task as identifying “how the [policy] texts present the causes 
of, and solutions to, health inequalities,” and express disap-
pointment that rhetorical commitments to tackling “wider 
determinants” translate into quite limited interventions 
(Smith et al., 2009, p. 220 ff).
Freeman (2006) asks similar questions about “how the 
problem of health equity is constructed in different coun-
tries” and also takes policy texts as his primary research 
material (p. 51). He uses the language of “problem defini-
tion” and “framing,” tracing the latter to cognitive psychol-
ogy (p. 59 fn 13; see also Dewulf et al., 2009). With Smith et 
al. (2009), Freeman locates himself theoretically within the 
“linguistic turn,” highlighting connections between framing 
and rhetoric, and linking his analysis to the interpretive tradi-
tion of scholars such as Rein and Schön (see above), Fischer 
(2003), and Stone (1988; Freeman, 2006, p. 52). Usefully 
Freeman explores assumptions about disease causation and 
the policy process that operate within selected policy texts, 
acknowledging the importance of “deep-rooted beliefs about 
rationality and linearity” (p. 64).
Bambra et al. (2011) explore the “different ways in which 
the ‘problem’ of health inequalities is conceived of” (p. 401) 
in three landmark British reports on the topic, those by Black 
(1980), Acheson (1998), and Marmot (2010). With Smith et al. 
(2009), they indicate disappointment with the recommenda-
tions in the reports. They express strong reservations about 
Marmot’s reliance on psychosocial, rather than material, fac-
tors as explanations of “health inequality” (p. 403). They 
also have concerns about the Marmot Review’s “capabilities” 
discourse, which, they argue,
could be translated into policy in ways which merely shift the 
responsibility for poor health onto individuals and communities 
who fail to develop the social networks required to ensure 
“resilience” against health problems. (p. 403)
WPR, as outlined earlier, does not analyze “problems” 
and “solutions” separately in the way that these contributions 
do. Rather, it begins with a postulated solution and identifies 
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the problem representation implicit within it. Hence, the 
level of critique differs. The target is not the rhetorical dis-
tance between descriptions of “problems” and “recommen-
dations,” which are judged to be limited or disappointing. 
The project starts from recommendations to see how the 
“problem” is constituted within them.
In this form of analysis, what is of most interest and con-
cern are continuities within policies, across statements of 
“problems” and “solutions,” continuities that rest on deep-
seated ontological and epistemological premises (Question 2 
above). The issue is not the rhetorical ploys of governments 
judged to be reluctant to deliver substantive change but 
“unexamined ways of thinking” (Foucault, 1981/1994, 
p. 456) that underpin specific policy proposals and shape 
“problems” as particular kinds of problems. In contrast to the 
three examples in this section, a WPR analysis does not focus 
primarily on language (see Bacchi & Bonham, 2014). Rather, 
governing is deemed to take place through the discourses, or 
knowledges, on which policy proposals rely. The usefulness 
of this form of analysis is illustrated through two examples: 
The South Australian (SA) Government’s Health Lens 
Analysis (HLA) on education, called “Parental Engagement 
with Literacy,” and the Australian Federal Government’s 
compulsory income management policy, described as 
“income quarantining.”
Example 1: “Parental Engagement With Literacy”
The HLA, “Parental Engagement With Literacy,” is an out-
come of the SA Government’s uptake of “Health in All 
Policies” as a way to improve population health. As Newman 
(2011) describes, “The HiAP approach is based on [govern-
ment departments in South Australia] working together to 
achieve win-win outcomes that enable both improved popu-
lation health outcomes and the realisation of other sectors’ 
goals” (p. 14). Targets are derived from the State 
Government’s Strategic Plan (SASP), with the understand-
ing that “the Senior Officers Groups will identify an appro-
priate policy focus for each Health Lens Analysis, approve 
project proposals and endorse the final project recommenda-
tions” (Government of South Australia, 2013, p. 5).
The Family Engagement With Literacy project involved a 
partnership between the SA Department of Education and 
Child Development (DECD) and the Department of Health 
and Ageing (DHA; Government of South Australia, 2013). It 
addressed the SASP Target 6.12: “By 2010, 93% of students 
in Year 3 to achieve the national benchmarks in reading, 
writing and numeracy” (Newman, 2011, p. 11). The aim of 
the project was
to raise parental engagement with literacy to improve literacy 
outcomes for children in the early years of schooling, and 
ultimately improve their health, with a particular focus on low 
socio-economic families. (Government of South Australia, 
2013, p. 8)
The “program logic” behind the initiative rested on the 
premise that “increased literacy leads to improved health” 
(Baum et al., 2014, pp. i135-i136). “Theoretical causal path-
ways” link the “short-term HiAP objective of increasing 
parental engagement in literacy at home” to “improved lit-
eracy and, eventually, to improved health” (Baum et al., 
2014, p. i136).
A WPR analysis begins with the recommendation or pro-
posal, in this instance that of increasing “parental engage-
ment with literacy.” Based on this proposal, the “problem” is 
constituted to be both lack of parental engagement and lack 
of literacy. Subsequent questions in the WPR approach (see 
above) identify grounding assumptions within these problem 
representations, genealogies of the identified problem repre-
sentations, and reflections on silences and effects, always 
with an eye to contestation and debate around the interven-
tions and how they represent the “problem.” Such questions 
produce the following critical reflections.
The expressed goal to increase parental engagement with 
their children’s literacy, which is underpinned by psychologi-
cal development theory (K. Osborne, Baum, & Brown, 2013, 
p. 11), rests upon assumptions about the role and responsibil-
ity of parents in producing “literate” citizens. According to 
Rose (2000), this form of “responsibilisation” operates at the 
“pole of morality,” a point strengthened through the explicit 
targeting of “low socio-economic families”: “It seeks to gov-
ern a polity through the micro-management of the self-
steering practices of its citizens” (p. 193).
“Literacy” meanwhile is a key indicator associated with 
contemporary governance objectives of securing the identity 
of citizens and the nation (Kelly, 2015), and developing a 
competitive and productive workforce (Salter, 2013, p. 12). 
Kelly (2015) shows how literacy forms part of a security 
apparatus, “a way of contingently positioning the capabilities 
of human subjects and populations in relation to the needs of 
forms of rule” (p. 178). Notably, “as a measurable and cultur-
ally normative activity,” literacy possesses the capacity to 
exclude. Kelly’s examples are remote Indigenous communi-
ties and prospective migrants.
Instead of accepting statistical correlations between 
“health” and “literacy” as drivers of policy formulation, 
therefore, a WPR analysis raises critical questions about “the 
frameworks of sense and obviousness with which policy is 
thought, talked and written about” (Ball, 2006, p. 44). 
“Parental engagement” and “literacy,” along with the prolif-
eration of new literacies, such as “financial literacy” (Bastian 
& Coveney, 2013, p. 165), “Asia literacy” (Salter, 2013), and 
“health literacy” (Green, Tones, Cross, & Woodall, 2015), 
and the theories upon which they rest, are treated as tech-
nologies of rule that require critical scrutiny.
Example 2: “Income quarantining” 
Compulsory income management, or “income quarantin-
ing,” is an Australian Federal Government initiative designed 
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to direct welfare income away from certain goods, such as 
cigarettes, alcohol, and gambling, deemed to be deleterious 
to the health and well-being of targeted groups. First applied 
in Indigenous communities, it has been broadened to encom-
pass other categories of welfare recipient (Bletsas, 2012).
In a 2013 review of “evidence relating to ‘what works’ to 
influence the social and economic determinants of Indigenous 
health,” K. Osborne et al. (2013) highlight the “difficulty in 
evaluating complex social policy such as income manage-
ment” (p. 32). The review raises concerns about the policy, 
specifically from a social determinants perspective, arguing 
that compulsion is “in tension with the need to fully involve 
Indigenous Australians as equal partners in taking action to 
improve their wellbeing” (K. Osborne et al., 2013, p. 32) 
Other critical reports, including a HIA (Health Impact 
Assessment) of the Northern Territory Emergency Response 
(see Bacchi, 2009, pp. 116-120), of which compulsory 
income management was a part, are mentioned alongside 
findings of “positive consequences” and a “mixed reaction” 
among some Indigenous communities. The review concludes 
that “the evidence of the benefits and disadvantages of this 
approach may be clearer after the policy has been in place for 
a longer period of time” (K. Osborne et al., 2013, p. 32).
A WPR analysis brings different questions to “evaluation.” 
The suggestion is that, rather than evaluating policies in terms 
of their abilities to “solve” problems, we need to study the 
ways policies constitute “problems.” The proposition is that 
governing takes place through the formation of “problems,” 
that is, through problematizations. In these terms, the pro-
posal to quarantine the income of welfare recipients, 
Indigenous and otherwise, produces the “problem” as inap-
propriate use of income. As Bletsas (2012) notes,
This policy reveals an individualistic understanding of poverty: 
It directs itself at altering the behaviour of individuals and the 
way they spend their income, not at the wider context in which 
such “individual” decisions are made. (pp. 39, 44)
Moreover, targeting the behaviors of specific groups of “sig-
nificant disadvantage” (Macklin, 2009 in Bletsas, 2012, 
p. 47) produces “poverty” as a residual condition restricted to 
“dysfunctional communities” who need to be “advanced in a 
developmental sense: So they can be caught up to the rest of 
‘us,’ the affluent, western, mainstream” (Bletsas, 2012, p. 47).
As illustrated in this example, a WPR form of analysis 
extends beyond forms of critique that offer structural expla-
nations of poverty to question how the individualistic way of 
constituting the “problem” in compulsory income manage-
ment shapes “subjects” and lives. It also prompts investiga-
tion into the genesis of that particular representation of the 
“problem,” challenging its taken-for-granted status as a 
mode of governing, and questioning its normalizing and inte-
grationist effects. In this form of analysis, problem represen-
tations are treated as political interventions that need to be 
contested at the level of what they produce.
Conclusions: The “Project Trap” and 
Deep Evaluation
The article advances a poststructuralist mode of theorizing, 
which, it suggests, opens up a new set of questions for health 
policy researchers. In the place of tracking policies through 
“stages” of development, it recommends critical analysis of 
the categories and knowledges that shape current governing 
practices. To instigate this form of investigation, it promotes 
the study of problematizations—how “problems” are consti-
tuted within policies and policy proposals.
Doubtless, this form of analysis faces all sorts of chal-
lenges, particularly in research settings where, often, “prob-
lems” are set by those in positions of authority. In the article 
examples of this practice appear in Pawson et al.’s (2005) 
“realist review” where problems are set by those commis-
sioning the research, in Ritchey’s (2011) GMA where the 
“problem area” is set by the “principal client” (pp. 64-67), 
and in South Australia’s HiAP program (Government of 
South Australia, 2013) where Senior Officers Groups iden-
tify an “appropriate policy focus” (p. 5).
We have here versions of what March, Smyth, and 
Mukhopadhyay (1999) call the “project trap,” where analytic 
frameworks (e.g., gender analysis, SDH) remain “narrowly 
applicable to programmes and projects” (p. 49), subservient 
to wider policy objectives. Pat Armstrong (2002), for exam-
ple, describes the limitations imposed on gender analysis by 
an inability to question the embrace of privatization by the 
Canadian government and how this mode of governing 
shapes health “problems.” Elsewhere, with Joan Eveline 
(Bacchi & Eveline, 2010a, p. 30), I introduce the idea of 
“deep evaluation” as an intervention to challenge the limita-
tions imposed by the ex post character of forms of policy 
analysis such as Emancipation Impact Assessments (Bacchi 
& Eveline, 2010b, p. 52) and HIAs, and by “inside govern-
ment” positioning (Delany et al., 2014, p. 8; Staudt, 2003). It 
includes as critical foci: (a) the meanings attached to key 
concepts (e.g., “equity”); (b) how the “problem” is repre-
sented (i.e., applying the WPR approach); (c) how “contexts” 
are represented.
For researchers, an even greater challenge involves the 
need to subject their own proposals to a WPR form of analy-
sis (see above). As forecast in the introductory comments, 
self-problematization is critical because, as with government 
policy, our classificatory selections actively constitute social 
reality (Bletsas, 2012). In this view, contra Bambra et al. 
(2011, p. 405), who suggest that researchers focus “less on 
describing the problem and more on ways to solve it,” 
researchers are called upon to contest the current emphasis 
on “problem-solving,” and to subject their own problemati-
zations to the kind of critical scrutiny a WPR analysis recom-
mends. The task becomes considering the extent to which 
recommended policy proposals, including one’s own propos-
als, either reproduce or disrupt modes of governing that 
install forms of marginalization and domination.
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Notes
1. The use of quotation marks around “problems” indicates that 
the term is being problematized (i.e., put into question as part 
of a critical analytic practice). In places where a specific the-
ory appears to accept problems as real in some way, quotation 
marks are omitted.
2. The term “constituted” refers to how “things” are brought into 
existence through practices. It sits at a distance from an inter-
pretive constructivist perspective in which the focus is on how 
social actors are “actively engaged in the creation of their own 
phenomenal world” (Burr, 2003, p. 19; see Bacchi, 2009, p. 33).
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